Key management in multicast dynamic groups, where users can leave or join at their ease is one of the most crucial and essential part of secure communication. Various efficient management strategies have been proposed during last decade that aim to decrease encryption costs and transmission overheads. In this report, two different types of key management schemes are proposed. First proposed scheme is based on One-way function tree (OFT).
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Internet protocol (IP) multicast, also known as multicast, is used to share contents with multiple users in a group. This form of communication tends to be efficient in terms of bandwidth as compared to unicast protocols, as it transmits information to every user in the group simultaneously. Internet group management protocol (IGMP) [9] is an example of multicast systems, in which any member can broadcast data to all n members in the group. Any user can join and receive contents in IGMP, which makes it a scalable system. Lack of access control and authentication poses security threats to IGMP, as any host can send and receive data from these systems. Conventional method to enforce restrictions on data flow is use of encryption to secure data contents, such that only the desired hosts can gather the data by utilizing cryptographic keys. Only the members with appropriate key can decrypt the data, which makes the communication secure and reliable.
Key distribution centre (KDC) or server is responsible for authentication of a user interested in joining the group. Server authenticates the user and allocates location to newly joined user. Server also provides the necessary keys to the user, which enables this user to communicate within the group.
Key management protocols are responsible for key pre-distribution and key updating in case of changes in the group. Group keys are shared among all the members and the contents to be shared are encrypted with this key and broadcasted to all group members. Such groups are supposed to be flexible enough to allow new hosts to join and present members to leave. Joining and leaving of hosts require change in the group key, so that the privacy and secrecy of the group members and their communication can be preserved. To maintain group keys, secure key management protocols are devised and employed. These protocols provide the authentication services, along with changing of the group keys with each user joining and leaving. The process of changing keys on every user join or leave is called key updating or rekeying.
Lack of presence of any key management protocol has rekeying cost of nK for n users. Logical key hierarchy (LKH) [5] and one-way function key tree (OFT) [1] are two much efficient centralized key management schemes. These both schemes differ in their functionalities; OFT follows down-up strategy as opposed to LKH which follows a static key tree structure. LKH has broadcast costs of 2hk h  for n users, where k is key size in bits and h is the height of tree. OFT scheme includes users along with the server in key updating process.
This makes the scheme more efficient and it cuts the overhead cost at rekeying by 1/ 2 , i.e., hk h  .
Security Requirements
Centralized key management schemes must, in all conditions, fulfill some security requirements. Their basic security requirements are forward and backward secrecy in the group. Security requirements are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
Forward Secrecy: Evicted members of the group are unable to access new information in the group, which states they cannot compute (or access) newer group keys.
Backward Secrecy: New members of the group are unable to access previous information in the group, which states that they cannot compute older group keys.
Objectives
To fill the security gap caused by collusion attacks on OFT and to reduce comparatively higher cost of LKH scheme, several improvements in both of these key management schemes have been proposed in this thesis.
OFT scheme is found to be weak against attacks by adversaries. We propose an improved OFT scheme, which guarantees better security at minimum costs.
We also propose a simple LKH scheme for key distribution which provides the same functionalities at lower transmission cost.
Our improvements guarantee less cost in both schemes.
Key Management Schemes
This chapter describes two main centralized key management schemes in detail; logical key hierarchy and one-way function key tree. This chapter also covers collusion attacks on OFT scheme and revisited security requirements for key management schemes.
Logical Key Hierarchy
LKH maps all members of the group as leaves of a structured tree, most commonly as a balanced binary tree. Group key is at the root of the tree, whereas the leaves represent group members. Group members have to store their individual keys, group key, and all node keys in the path from member to the group key. On each user leave or join, group key and other node keys in the path must be changed. New group key can be distributed by following the algorithms for join and leave functions, which will be defined in next subsections.
The complexity for key distribution to n users will be ) (log n O .
LKH Tree Structure
All users in the group store 2 log 1 n  keys, out of which one is their individual key and all other h keys belong to the middle nodes in its path to the group node key. These h keys with the user need to be changed after each join or leave. ', k respectively.
On User Join
The key distribution process for each user join can be listed as:
1. Server authenticates the interested user 8 u and allocates it an empty place in the group tree. Server also provides individual key 8 k to the new user. 
New group key '
k is sent by multicast to 5 6 7 ( , , ) u u u and 1 2 3 4 ( , , , ) u u u u after being encrypted with 58 ' k and 14 , k respectively.
On User Leave
On eviction of user, middle node keys must be changed to preserve communication secrecy in the group. 
One-Way Function Key Tree
OFT key management scheme decreases server-level computation, as computation load is distributed between the server and group members.
Rekeying overhead for OFT is hk h  . Details of these functions are as follows.
• One-way function, () g  : The keys are passed through a strong oneway function to hide the contents of the original key. These "blinded" keys can be shared to corresponding users without any security concerns.
• Joining function, ( , ) f a b : This function concatenates or combines two entities, a and . b 
OFT Structure
In OFT, keys are dependent on each other. 
Group key k can be generated by all members of the group as 14 58
Here, server as well as all group users participates to compute the group key. 
On User Join
The blinded values of the calculated keys are encrypted with their sibling keys and advertised to existing group members by multicast as follows: :{ ( ' )} and :
On User Leave
On every user leave, group key must be changed to preserve forward and backward secrecy. The sibling of the evicted user is assigned with new key and it moves up to their parent's node. The group key alters because of these steps. 
Updated right subgroup key 58 ' k is shared with complementary left subgroup, whose members can calculate the new group key.
By using this procedure, the need of multicasting all updated keys is reduced, as the users can compute necessary keys themselves. Only few blinded node keys are sent to particular users and subgroups. OFT reduces the required broadcasts to nearly half as compared to LKH scheme.
Collusion Attacks on OFT

Horng's Attack
Horng [6] shows that OFT scheme is susceptible to collusion attacks, where leaving and joining users can collude their information of group keys to find older or newer group keys as shown in Figure 2 Here we present an example of such an attack on OFT. ( ( ' ), ( ' )). ( ( ' ), ( )).
OFT scheme is unsuccessful to provide forward secrecy against 3 u and backward secrecy against 5 . u
Ku and Chen's Attack
Ku and Chen [10] present some other cases of collusion attacks on OFT. We present these conditions here. Consider Figure 2 Candy knows the blinded node key of subgroup G l between time t 2 and t 3 .
Alice and Candy can share their information about blinded node keys of subgroups to compute group key between time t 2 and t 3 .
In both of these cases, successful collusion attacks occur, which compromise the security of group communication. OFT scheme has security vulnerabilities, which must be addressed.
Security Requirements
Now we list some security requirements which must be fulfilled by all key management schemes in order to ensure secure communication in dynamic multicast systems.
Group key secrecy: Any passive adversary is unable in any way
to compute previous or existing group key. This also implies that adversary is also unable to find any changed node key in the group.
Mathematical operations and random numbers involved in rekeying must be cryptographically strong.
Forward key secrecy:
Passive adversaries or former members of the group, who may know any subset of older group keys, cannot find any new group key.
3. Backward key secrecy: Passive adversaries or present members of the group, who may know any subset of group keys, are unable to discover any previously used group key.
Key independence:
Passive adversaries or former and present members of the group, who may know any subset of group keys, are unable to discover any other group key.
5. Reuse of known node keys: Evicted members must not discover any new information that is flowing within the group. Sometimes evicted users can use their prior knowledge of node keys to decrypt any future transmission. All node keys known to a leaving member must be changed during rekeying process.
6. OFT group key segments: Group key in OFT scheme is combination of blinded node keys of its two children. These two children nodes represent left and right subgroup node keys. For each user leave, both segments of the group key must be changed. This step prevents occurring of any collusion attacks.
New Secure OFT Scheme
In this chapter, improvement in the OFT schemes will be introduced, that is, OFT scheme is vulnerable to collusion attacks and thus this scheme needs extra steps to make it reliable enough for proper functionalities.
We propose new OFT scheme with more security and lesser costs.
Introduction
In OFT scheme, all members are given the blinded node keys of their siblings and their ancestors' siblings. They can then calculate the desired node and group keys by using these blinded node keys. In this way, a part of computation load is transferred to the users from the server. In OFT, rekeying overhead decreases as a result of combined computations by the server and members.
First we define the levels and locations of the members in the group. In the above figure,
• TEK: traffic encryption key (group key), used for communicating with all the users in the group (highest level node key)
• KEK: key encryption keys, also called as sub-group keys. They are used for encrypting the group key for its transfer (intermediate level node keys).
• IK: Individual keys of users (lowest level node keys)
• Height of tree (h): Number of levels in the tree. For example, the tree shown in Figure 3 -1 has height of 3. We provide all the users with location indices which give information about their level and location in the group. Users must have 
() gk
Similarly, other users have the blinded node keys stored with the same pattern.
Our scheme performs only at user eviction. On user join, it follows the scheme of original OFT.
On User Leave
In case of eviction, the sibling of the removed user takes the place of their parent. Also its sibling key changes, which causes change in the node key and the group key. 
Key Requirements
Node keys are dependent in OFT scheme and users contribute in generation of node keys. Users have blinded node keys of their siblings and parent's siblings, which are used to efficiently generate new keys without much intervention from server. Group members update the keys present with them and generate new node keys and the group key. New keys can be generated as explained in the following protocol.
Algorithm on User Eviction
We present the algorithm which is followed by our scheme at user eviction.
1.
Server removes the node of evicted member from the key tree and promotes its sibling, if any, to higher level which was the level of its parent before eviction.
2.
Server provides new node key to evicted member's sibling. It also shares the changed blinded node keys with appropriate neighboring members.
3. All members of the affected subgroup can compute new subgroup node key.
Server shares this new subgroup node key in blinded form with
neighboring unaffected subgroup members.
5.
For the unaffected subgroup, server generates and shares a random number with its members.
6.
Members update stored node keys by XORing them with the provided random number, after which the resulting values are passed through one-way function to generate new node keys.
7.
All members of unaffected subgroup can calculate new subgroup node key by utilizing one-way and combining functions on blinded node key.
8.
This new subgroup node key is then shared with the neighboring (unaffected) subgroup.
9.
All members of the group can use blinded node keys of affected 6. Users can change the blinded node keys with them, so as to alter the overall left blinded subgroup node keys. Already available blinded node keys can be changed like as shown in Table 3 .2. 
Simulation and Results
Results of our proposed scheme and the conventional key management schemes are shown in this section. Table 3 .3 shows security properties of some of the known schemes, and shows that our proposed scheme has got better security strength. [9] Y Y Y OFT [7] N N N Ku and Chen [10] Y Tables 3.4 and 3 .5 show performance of various schemes. They show that our scheme has less broadcast costs for user leave, as compared to scheme by Ku and Chen [10] . Our scheme performs even more efficiently than OFT for large group sizes. (log ( )) log ( ) nn  Proposed sol. 
Security Analysis of Proposed Scheme
Step 2: Bob joins
Step 3: Candy joins
As seen in this case also, Alice is not able to collude with present members in order to find illegitimate group keys.
Thus, the proposed scheme prevents any collusion attacks.
Multicast Scheme Based on LKH
In this chapter, we will provide a new scheme based on LKH. Our proposed scheme is more efficient than the original LKH scheme in terms of communication overheads needed at rekeying.
System Design
Design Principles
Firstly, we outline some basic principles, which our proposed scheme will comply. We use binary key tree, which tends to balance itself in order to maintain the symmetry. Interested hosts can join the group through a process which includes sending request to the server and passing the authentication by the server.
Server provides an empty place on the group to the new users. Server also provides the new member with all the necessary keys through the key management protocol. Similarly, present members can leave the group by sending request to the server, who in return eradicates the user and its corresponding node from the key tree. Sibling of the leaving node moves to the position of their parent node.
Detailed Outline
On each join or leave, keys in the path from that location to server need to be Our proposed scheme possesses the following distinctive features while distributing keys for right subgroup.
• Our scheme follows bottom-to-top approach, where bottom node keys are firstly distributed to the desired members, moving upwards.
• Higher level node keys are encrypted with lower level ones, and multicast to subsequent subgroups. For example, subgroup key at level-1 will be distributed by encrypting it with individual keys at level-0. After that, a subgroup key at level-2 is encrypted with level-1 key before multicast, and so on.
• Instead of wasting resources by sending all keys to only one user, our proposed scheme moves in a step-wise manner thus providing all essential keys to members.
On User Join
After the interested host is successfully authenticated, server allocates the host an empty location in the group. Group key tree is renewed, according to following protocol. Example protocol for height 3 h  is described below, which will be generalized afterwards. 
Key Requirements
Depending on their location in the group, members require different keys to update the essential keys. Desired keys by user can be outlined as 
Protocol for User Join
To share keys among the members of the group, they are encrypted by individual or subgroup keys and sent through unicast or multicast to respective members.
{} ij kk represents encryption of the group key k by any subgroup key ij k . The same notation is used in describing the schemes.
The protocol for key management on user join is given below, where the keys are being transmitted by the server to various locations. 
On User Leave
User leave makes an empty slot in the binary balanced key tree. Sibling of the leaving user gets promoted to the position of its parent's node. 
Key Requirements
For each user leave, server generates and shares 
Protocol for User Leave
Less number of keys is shared on each user leave, contrary to the number of 
Simulation and Results
Performance of our proposed scheme as compared to LKH scheme is shown in this section.
Performance Comparison
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show performance of various schemes. They show that our scheme has less broadcast costs for user leave and join as compared to other key management schemes. Our scheme performs more efficiently than LKH and the communication overhead of our scheme is less than that of LKH. Encryption cost of our proposed scheme is also less than the original LKH scheme. 
Empirical Analysis
Following table shows broadcast costs at user join and leave for LKH and our scheme. The improvement in results can be analyzed from the table. Table 4 .3 shows that our scheme has less broadcast costs for user join and leave, as compared to LKH. Thus, our scheme is more efficient than LKH in terms of costs. Leave  10  30  20  20  18  12  36  24  24  22  13  39  26  26  24  14  42  28  28  26  15  45  30  30  28  16  48  32  32  30  17  51  34  34  32  18  54  36  36  34   Table 4 .4 compares our proposed scheme at user join and leave with original LKH scheme. It is clear that even for large groups, our proposed scheme gives better overhead costs. 
Conclusion
Key management in dynamic groups, where users can leave or join at their ease is an important part of secure communication. Different strategies have been proposed during last decade that aim to either improve the security or the performance of key management schemes. Decreasing the encryption and transmission overheads has also been a major concern for such schemes.
In this thesis, we proposed two schemes based on different architectures. One of the schemes improves the security of OFT scheme. We showed the resilience of proposed scheme by analyzing different cases. The other proposed scheme improves the performance of independent key hierarchy system (LKH).
Both proposed schemes provide better broadcast and transmission costs than previously published schemes.
